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Nanotechnology, governance and public deliberation. 
What role for the social sciences?1 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we argue that nanotechnology represent an extraordinary opportunity to 
build in a robust role for the social sciences in a technology that remains at an early, 
and hence undetermined, stage of development. We examine policy dynamics in both 
the United States and United Kingdom aimed both at opening up, and closing down, 
the role of the social sciences in nanotechnologies. We then set out a prospective 
agenda for the social sciences and its potential in the future shaping of 
nanotechnology research and innovation processes. The emergent, undetermined 
nature of nanotechnologies calls for an open, experimental and interdisciplinary 
model of social science research. 
 
Keywords 
Nanotechnology, governance, upstream public engagement, imaginaries 
 
Introduction 
Social science historically developed alongside the new industrial order, which was 
based upon novel technologies of steam based power, the railways and the factory 
system. Marx analysed this new technological society as it unfolded around him in 
mid-nineteenth century Britain. However, during the twentieth century, social science 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank our colleagues who contributed towards a proposal on nanotechnology and 
society – in particular, Brian Bloomfield, Bob Jessop, Lucy Suchman, Bron Szerszynski, John Urry, 
Claire Waterton and James Wilsdon. This paper emerges out of a collective effort and many of the 
ideas expressed emerged out of a highly profitable joint thinking and writing process. 
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has often struggled to keep pace with new and emerging technologies. It was slow to 
provide intelligence and reflexive analysis of the implications of personal 
automobility, the splitting of the atom, and the significance of early computing. 
 
In this paper we argue that nanotechnology represents an extraordinary opportunity to 
build in social science insight from the outset. By thinking of its role in a new way 
and taking the reflexive governance of nanotechnologies as a central concern, social 
science has novel opportunities to become an actor in these changes, and to provide 
insights that are simultaneous with scientific, technological and social changes.  
 
However, analysis of all such ‘technosocial orders’ presents significant challenges to 
existing ways of doing social science, especially in the outmoded idiom of seeking to 
examine a categorically social realm as distinct from physical and material elements 
(Latour 2004). Historically, the academic literature has framed technology as ‘black-
boxed’ and well-defined, with an independent asocial logic that results in ‘impacts’ or 
‘effects’. Social questions are often narrowly framed as ‘impacts’ or ‘risk’ issues, 
placing the site of social science inquiry firmly ‘downstream’ of innovation processes 
(for a recent nanotechnology example, see European Commission 2004). However, 
various approaches in science and technology studies have shown how technologies 
cannot be black-boxed and separated from sets of constitutive social relations (see 
Wynne 1988; Pinch and Bijker 1984; Law and Hassard 1999).  
 
‘Constructive technology assessment’ (Rip, Misa and Schot 1995) and ‘real time 
technology assessment’ (Guston and Sarewitz 2002), represent two approaches that 
problematise the determinism of black-boxed technology. Both approaches focus on 
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how ‘technical’ processes often make implicit upstream assumptions about the social 
uses to which the technology will be put: under what conditions, by which kinds of 
actor, and with what aims (Law and Bijker 1992; Grint and Woolgar 1997). Social 
and political relations, or imagined relations, are ‘hard-wired’ into technological 
designs, and performed by them (Winner 1977). Science and technology theorists 
suggest that a fundamental characteristic of any technology is its heterogeneous, 
hybrid mix of material, social and discursive relations, its mix of pure and applied 
elements, and its associated and often prescriptive social expectations or assumptions 
(Latour 2004; MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999). The goal of such processes is to 
engage forms of public participation before innovation processes become locked in – 
in other words at an upstream stage. In this paper we set out and critically engage with 
the notion of ‘upstream public engagement’, as a further and potentially useful 
addition to the unfolding academic and policy debate. 
 
Such a conceptual approach lies in stark contrast to the more limited role of the social 
sciences that tended to characterise its use in the development of biotechnologies. 
Dominant approaches, institutionally cemented through programmes aimed at 
understanding the ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI) surrounding the Human 
Genome project, locked into a framing that assumed the technology as a given, and as 
such, assumed the project of ethical and social reflection as one largely reduced to 
conceptualising and evaluating and managing ‘the impacts’. Through such framing 
commitments, ELSI programmes lacked any mechanism to affect the innovation 
process itself. Relatedly, the birthing of ‘bioethics’ that arose out of this agenda has 
been largely complicit with deficit models of science communication (Wynne 2001; 
Hedgecoe & Martin 2003). Indeed, we have argued elsewhere that the framing of the 
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social sciences in the development and utilisation of genetically modified (GM) crops 
and foods was such that its mobilisation was often too late and without any real 
purchase on on-going processes of governance (Kearnes et al. forthcoming).  
 
More generally, in the domain of biotechnologies, there was little institutionally 
sanctioned space for the social sciences to engage with wider social and political 
questions about purposes, ownership, control and responsibility (Grove-White et al. 
2000; Wilsdon & Willis 2004). Why these technologies? Why not others? Who needs 
them, and what human purposes are driving them? Under what conditions will they 
be enacted; and who sets those conditions? Who is controlling them? Who benefits 
from them? Can they be trusted? Drawing on the lessons from GM and other 
controversies, nanotechnology reflects an opportunity for the social sciences to 
explore how governance and regulation can be extended to incorporate a wider set of 
cultural and social, and indeed technical, factors (Kearnes et al. forthcoming). We 
suggest that unless this challenge is addressed, the latent tensions inherent in the 
technological transformation of democratic society are likely to remain unaddressed. 
Far from being a ‘critical’ project therefore, this is a constructive one, requiring robust 
collaborative interactions with scientists and technologists.  
 
Significantly, there appears to be some institutional recognition of the need for a 
wider role for the social sciences in the development of nanotechnologies, including a 
clear undertaking for novel forms of public dialogue and engagement (see Department 
of Trade and Industry/ Office of Science and Technology 2005; Royal Society/RAE 
2004). In this paper we address some of the underlying machinations and rationales at 
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work for building social science into the development of nanotechnology. These 
include: 
 
• The appeal to social scientists as experts in the study of public opinion and 
political mobilisation processes, hence leading to promises that such socially-
sensitive intelligence may help avoid future disruptive public controversy; 
• The ability of social science to help shape innovation processes in tune with wider 
public and consumer attitudes, thus helping governments and corporates ‘pick-
winners’ and ‘avoid-losers’; 
• The exploitation of social scientists as (good) public communicators and 
disseminators of nanoscience and nanotechnologies, often in an outreach capacity, 
thus again helping shape a more informed and arguably less emotive but not 
necessarily less critical public debate; 
• The attempt to use social science techniques to open up the ‘black-box’ of science 
and innovation, so that tacit assumptions shaping its development can be opened 
to wider public scrutiny, to induce greater reflexive awareness amongst scientists 
in their specialist work worlds, with the expected result that innovation processes 
indirectly gain added sensitivity to human needs and aspirations, and thus greater 
resilience and sustainability. 
 
The distinctions between these framings are of course ambiguous – indeed, most are 
at play in different ways in multiple contexts. Similarly it is an open question which 
of these framings will come to the fore and dominate. In this sense nanotechnology 
represents an opportunity to innovate new and more reflexive relationships between 
the social sciences and the physical sciences. However, despite this renewed openness 
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to social science input, there is a danger that such input is framed in ways that assume 
the prima facie beneficence of technology and that would seek to limit the scope for 
social science input to disturb core innovation processes. We argue below that in both 
the United States and United Kingdom there is an emerging dynamic aimed both at 
opening up, and closing down, the role of the social sciences in shaping future 
nanoscience and nano-innovation research agendas and trajectories. We then set out, 
in programmatic form, what a more open-ended agenda for the social sciences of 
nanotechnologies might look like. 
 
The Public Debate 
In the past two years, a policy and media debate about nanoscience and 
nanotechnologies has emerged, characterised by competing visions of promise and 
threat. For their advocates, nanotechnologies are seen to have huge economic and 
social potential, ushering in a ‘new industrial revolution’ that will include 
breakthroughs in computer efficiency, pharmaceuticals, nerve and tissue repair, 
surface coatings, catalysts, sensors, materials, telecommunications and pollution 
control (European Commission 2004; House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee 2004; Roco & Bainbridge 2001). Worldwide research funding for 
nanosciences and nanotechnologies is increasing rapidly, and is estimated to have 
reached $8.6 billion in 2004 (Lux Research 2004).  
 
At the same time, ethical, social and environmental concerns which originated with 
dystopian fears of ‘grey goo’ (Joy 2000; Drexler 1986) are rapidly taking on a sharper 
focus around the potential toxicity of nanoparticles and the need for tighter regulation 
(Nature 2003; Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering 2004). NGOs have 
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criticised the vested interests that lie behind the science, and Prince Charles has raised 
the spectre of thalidomide in an effort to encourage a more precautionary approach 
(ETC Group 2003; HRH The Prince of Wales 2004). 
 
Such bipolar characterisations are of course an oversimplification. The questions, 
challenges and opportunities that surround nanotechnologies will take many forms. 
Indeed, the very definitions and constitutions of nanotechnologies are themselves the 
subject of lively debate, within the scientific community and beyond (House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee 2004). 
 
As conventionally understood, the term ‘nanotechnology’ refers to the design or 
manipulation of structures and devices at a scale of 1 to 100 nanometres (or billionths 
of a metre). Yet scale is one characteristic that unites the diverse activities and 
applications commonly referred to in this way. A crucial further issue is the novelty 
and unpredictability of what occurs at this scale. When broken down into such small 
particles, the properties of materials can change in fundamental ways. Gold and silver 
are good examples. Normally inert and unreactive, at the nanoscale gold acts as a 
highly effective catalyst, and silver displays bioactive properties (Smith 2004). 
 
Working at this scale requires a high degree of interdisciplinarity, and nanoscience 
increasingly extends across a range of fields, from chemistry, physics and biology, to 
medicine, engineering and computer science. Yet while the term ‘nanotechnology’ 
may be relatively new, much of the science behind it is not. Many existing chemical 
processes have nanoscale features, and nanotechnologies have been used to create 
computer chips for the past 20 years. From a social science perspective, this raises 
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important questions about the processes through which such terminologies are being 
defined, contested and continually adapted in relation to external economic and 
political drivers. 
 
Given the novelty of what becomes possible at the nanoscale, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that nanotechnologies are giving rise to new, and potentially profound, 
social questions. These have moved with remarkable rapidity onto the political and 
regulatory agenda in the UK, across Europe the United States and beyond. Additional 
complexities flow from the convergence of nanoscale innovations in different 
domains: notably, the life sciences, cognitive sciences and information technology 
(Nordmann 2004; Wood et al. 2003; European Commission 2004). We now address 
the policy debate shaping the role of the social sciences in the United States. 
 
The United States 
In the US, the context for research into the social and ethical dimensions of new and 
emerging technology has been shaped fundamentally by the institutional support and 
commitment granted to the ELSI program of the Human Genome Project (Ramsay 
2001). The ELSI program was established to provide: 
 
A new approach to scientific research by identifying, analyzing and addressing 
the ethical, legal and social implications of human genetics research at the 
same time that the basic science is being studied. In this way, problem areas 
[would] be identified and solutions developed before scientific information is 
integrated into health care practice. (National Human Genome Research 
Institute 2004) 
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The ELSI approach clearly sets the institutional and intellectual context for current 
considerations of nanotechnology. As already noted above, however, there remains a 
fundamental tension at the heart of the approach. Although research is clearly 
intended to feed social and ethical insight into science and technology developments 
in ‘real-time’, it is framed as being able to scrutinise only the impacts or effects of the 
technology rather than (as set out above) deeper social and political considerations 
about driving purposes and visions which may be exercised in shaping knowledge-
production; as well as broader issues about ownership, control and responsibility. 
Rather than being a mode through which social science insights may be ‘built-into’ 
technological development, both upstream and in real-time, it is becoming 
increasingly apparent that the ELSI agenda reduces such scholarship to a downstream 
‘bolt-on’. In its focus on impacts and effects the ELSI program assumes the 
inevitability of prevailing and future forms of technology and limits the role of social 
science to downstream questions. As such, social science scholarship is invoked only 
after significant commitments are already made and technological pathways have 
become locked in, thus without any real purchase on the development of such 
technologies.  
 
The way that ethical and societal enquiry is positioned in relation to nanotechnology 
in the United States demonstrates the influence of this approach and the tension 
therein. The National Nanotechnology Initiative report, Leading to the Next Industrial 
Revolution (2000), for example, outlines the role of ethical and societal inquiry in the 
following terms: 
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Ethical, Legal, Societal Implications and Workforce Education and Training 
efforts will be undertaken to promote a new generation of skilled workers in 
the multidisciplinary perspectives necessary for rapid progress in 
nanotechnology. The impact nanotechnology has on society from legal, 
ethical, social, economic, and workforce preparation perspectives will be 
studied. The research will help us identify potential problems and teach us 
how to intervene efficiently in the future on measures that may need to be 
taken. (pg. 13; see also Bennett and Sarewitz forthcoming) 
 
The report further outlines how such research will be carried out in real-time, in 
concert with scientific and technical innovation, and how it will provide early 
evidence of potential social and ethical ‘problems’ enabling upstream intervention. 
However, as with the ELSI program of the Human Genome Project such research is 
also implicated in the ‘success’ of the federally funded National Nanotechnology 
Initiative (NNI). That the NNI is, at least rhetorically, to lead to the ‘next industrial 
revolution’ is not subjected to ethical or sociological inquiry. And in this particular 
sense, the envisaged role of the social sciences can be seen  as a social lubricant in the 
drive towards industrial success and commercialisation. This is a position more or less 
enthusiastically embraced by Roco and Bainbridge (2001) in their report on the 
National Science Foundation sponsored workshop on the ‘Societal Implications of 
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology’. Indeed, in their introduction to the workshop, 
Roco and Bainbridge set out the role of social science research in the following terms: 
 
Research on societal implications will boost the NNI’s success and help us to 
take advantage of the new technology sooner, better and with greater 
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confidence... [and later] Nanotechnology’s effect on society – legal, ethical, 
social, economic, and workforce preparation – will be studied to help identify 
potential concerns and ways to address them. As the NNI is commencing, 
there is a rare opportunity to integrate the societal studies and dialogues from 
the very beginning and to include societal studies as a core part of the NNI 
investment strategy. (pgs. 2 & 10, emphases in original) 
 
In this way, although the social sciences are seen as playing a legitimate and 
potentially integrating role in the development of nanoscience and nanotechnology, 
such an involvement is still coupled to a relatively unproblematised notion of 
‘success’, and to a very downstream vision of the scope for social science which 
excludes social dimensions of the processes shaping the knowledge and technologies 
themselves. The positioning of societal and ethical research in this way is therefore 
imbued with the same, unresolved, tension as in the Human Genome Project. Though 
such research is to be both funded and supported by central government, and 
positioned in such a way as to promise to influence the trajectory of developments in 
nanotechnology, it is currently unclear whether such research will be able to achieve 
the necessary distance from projected innovation roadmaps. The ELSI component of 
the NNI is framed in a way that makes this tension both ambiguous and unresolved.  
 
Such unresolved tensions can also be identified in the 2003 21st Century 
Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, a largely administrative act designed 
to authorise appropriations for nanoscience, nanoengineering and nanotechnology 
research. While specific legislative clauses are written into the act to ensure that 
ethical, legal, environmental and societal concerns are addressed during the 
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development of the technology, it remains unclear as to how and in what ways such 
an integrated agenda is imagined to impinge on the development of the science 
agenda itself. Such tensions are currently being played out in 2005 in related to 
National Science Foundation proposals for a major $13 million ‘Center for 
Nanotechnology in Society’, not least in relation to the legal stipulation to consider 
the potential use of nanotechnology in human enhancement.  
 
To summarise, even though the role of the social sciences in the US has tended to be 
framed as limited to the exploration of the societal impacts arising from nanoscience 
and nanotechnology there remains significant scope for a wider role due to the 
parallel ambitions for social research to become integrated with innovation processes 
in real time. Such ambiguity has created an opening in the normally ‘black-boxed’ 
processes of technological development and innovation, the effect of which will only 
become visible in the coming years.  
 
The United Kingdom 
Although the social sciences benefited from a well-targeted ESRC funded report on 
the Social and Economic Challenges of Nanotechnology (Wood et al. 2003), it was 
the publication in July 2004 of the UK Royal Society/ Royal Academy of Engineering 
report on nanotechnologies that signalled the start of a new phase in UK debates on 
nanotechnology and society. Learning from recent experience with biotechnology, the 
Royal Society highlighted a key role for the social sciences to help provide improved 
insights into the implications of nanotechnologies and their role in helping facilitate 
more socially robust technologies.  
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This move poses significant challenges and opportunities which are only beginning to 
be conceptualised. Not least on account of the widespread public ambivalence 
towards science that is manifest in the UK, to what extent is it possible to create 
frameworks of governance that can sustain economically vibrant, socially-legitimate 
and environmentally sustainable technological enterprises? How are individuals and 
institutions, confronted with rapid technological change, to imagine new social 
possibilities, and choose among them wisely? And how may all of this pan out for the 
poor, for developing countries, and for the development process generally. A number 
of initiatives in the UK have begun research aimed at developing insights on these 
questions, so as ultimately to generate more socially-intelligent processes of 
regulation, public dialogue and technology assessment (Department of Trade and 
Industry/ Office of Science and Technology 2005; Macnaghten et al. 2003; Wilsdon 
& Willis 2004; Wilsdon et al. 2005).  
 
The policy context in the UK, including its particular preoccupations with ‘public 
engagement’, needs to be situated within a particular historical context. Following a 
series of controversies – such as ‘mad cow’ disease and genetically modified crops 
and foods – there is growing institutional commitment for new mechanisms of public 
involvement in the social and ethical dimensions of science and technology (Better 
Regulation Task Force 2003; House of Lords 2000; Royal Commission of 
Environment and Pollution 1998). More recently, policy discussions have started to 
focus on the need for public engagement to take place ‘upstream’ in processes of 
innovation, at a stage when it can influence research decisions, and before entrenched 
or polarised positions emerge (Grove-White et al. 2000; Wilsdon and Willis 2004; 
Wynne 2003). For example, the UK government’s new ten-year strategy for science 
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and innovation includes a commitment ‘to enable [public] debate to take place 
“upstream” in the scientific and technological development process, and not 
“downstream” where technologies are waiting to be exploited but may be held back 
by public scepticism brought about through poor engagement and dialogue on issues 
of concern’ (HM Treasury/Department of Trade and Industry/Department of 
Education and Skills  2004: 105). This argument has now been adopted in relation to 
nanotechnologies by the Royal Society, the Science Minister Lord Sainsbury, and the 
Office of Science and Technology (Department of Trade and Industry 2004; 
Department of Trade and Industry/ Office of Science and Technology 2005; Royal 
Society/ Royal Academy of Engineering 2004). 
 
These commitments to ‘upstream’ public engagement in processes of scientific-
technological innovation are a significant shift in public policy discourse, and raise 
many unresolved questions for social science as well as for science itself. At what 
stages in R&D processes is it realistic to raise issues of public accountability and 
social concern? How and on whose terms should such issues be debated? Are 
dominant institutional discourses of risk, ethics and ‘social responsibility’ adequate 
for addressing these issues? Can citizen-consumers exercise constructive influence 
over the pace and direction of technological (and related social) change? How can 
these questions be reconciled with the need to maintain the independence of science, 
and the economic dynamism of its applications? 
 
Of course, such a portrayal of UK policy-making on nanotechnology and the extended 
role of the social sciences is only one part of a complex and unfolding set of forces. 
There is a further and more familiar conservative dynamic at play in which social 
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science is seen as having a far more limited role in the development of nanoscience 
policy. Indeed, such a view was reflected in the UK Government response to the 
Royal Society/ Royal Academy of Engineering report in which the social sciences 
barely made a mention, where the language of ‘upstream’ public engagement failed to 
make the final draft, and where no new money was offered (HM Government 2005). 
Even the Royal Society declared itself ‘very disappointed’ (Royal Society 2005)! 
 
It has been striking to see the rapid official uptake in UK and EU science policy 
communities of the idea of upstream public engagement with science; an idea that 
emanated from an extensive academic scholarship in science and technology studies 
and more recently in the writing of key scholars involved in public policy (see Marris 
et al. 2001; Wynne 2001 2003; Wilsdon and Willis 2004). However the more 
complex shift of focus which an ‘upstream’ focus was intended to introduce has rarely 
been noticed in this official uptake, and which thus has remained riddled with 
confusion and ambiguity. This can be noted, for example, in the otherwise admirable 
UK Royal Society/ Royal Academy of Engineering (2004) report on 
nanotechnologies. In contrast to Wynne’s framing of upstream forms of public 
engagement as emphatically not pretending to earlier prediction of impacts or social 
reactions so as better to manage these, the Royal Society/ Royal Academy of 
Engineering report outlines the potential role of such engagements is help to 
anticipate sensitive issues. For example: 
 
The hope expressed in evidence submitted to the group is that methods for 
upstream deliberation may help society to find appropriate resolutions for 
potential conflicts in advance, by better anticipation of sensitive issues. (p. 66) 
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By contrast, Wynne and colleagues have stressed the logic that the predicament of 
ignorance and unpredictability - of which ordinary publics appear only too aware 
(Marris et al 2001; Grove-White et al.1997) - implies that we need to develop novel 
techniques aimed at eliciting, explicating and subjecting to wider debate and scrutiny, 
the driving purposes, expectations, imaginations and social ends of upstream 
knowledge. Such debate would provide a different ethical and social context for 
scientific practice, including R&D investment. 
 
Thus, we suggest, upstream engagement does not concern publics telling scientists 
what to do or think, nor assert that ordinary people know better than scientists about 
risks, - as the prevalent, and blatantly confused, prediction-immersed understanding 
of upstream engagement with science still mistakenly implies. Rendering scientific 
cultures more self-aware of their own taken-for-granted expectations, visions and 
imaginations of the ultimate ends of knowledge, and rendering these more articulated, 
and thus more socially accountable and resilient, is a radically different kind of role 
for the social sciences. This, we argue, lies in science’s own best interest, as it would 
provide the grounds for a public legitimacy that its patrons and exploiters are so 
anxiously seeking.      
 
What kind of social science is required? 
As we have demonstrated the science and policy debate around nanotechnologies 
represents a novel opportunity for building in the social sciences into its upstream 
development. As we seek to map out such an agenda, we need to bear in mind that 
such upstream terrain has traditionally been regarded as properly fenced off from 
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social attention. How can this complex and difficult terrain, as yet uncharted, be 
addressed in a constructive and responsible way?  We conclude this paper by setting 
out a prospective agenda for the social sciences and its potential in the development of 
nanotechnology research and innovation processes. The emergent, undetermined 
nature of nanotechnologies - technoscience ‘in-the-making’ (Latour 1987) - calls for 
an open, experimental and interdisciplinary model of social science research. From 
the outset, the ambition is to develop interdisciplinary approaches which seek to 
embrace the complexities of nanotechnologies, and their emergent, materialising and 
condensing social relationships. We now discuss five potentially rich veins of social 
science research activity: 
 
I. Imaginaries 
A social science of nanotechnology should seek to unpack the ways in which 
nanotechnology is imagined—in both technical and social terms—and to assess the 
role that such imaginaries play in innovation processes. Understanding the implicit 
assumptions, values and visions – or ‘imaginaries’ – of key actors has been 
recognised as a central part of the social science challenge, on account of their 
significant role in shaping research and innovation trajectories (Brown and Michael 
2003; Kearnes et al. forthcoming; Hedgecoe and Martin 2003; Rose 2001; van Lente 
1993). 
 
The term ‘imaginary’ shares the sense of vision and fantasy implied by the term 
‘imagination’. But it dissolves the opposition of the imagined and the real: whether an 
imaginary is based in fantasy or in evidence remains an empirical question rather than 
one to be settled a priori (Marcus 1995; Verran 1998). The key point is, imaginaries 
 19
are materially-powerful; they do shape practices, relationships and commitments 
(which are often rendered irreversible); and as such, they demand reflective, 
accountable attention and debate.   
 
As well as shaping the expectations of individuals and institutions, imaginaries are 
mobilised through ongoing public discourses and enacted in everyday practices. They 
are multiple, partial and often internally inconsistent (Fleck 1979; MacKenzie 1992; 
Squier 1995, Suchman and Bishop 2000). Emerging technologies, surrounded by 
ambivalence and conflicting narratives of utopia and dystopia, provide fertile ground 
in which the moral dilemmas of modernity are rehearsed. While some visions are 
repeatedly promoted – progress/cornucopia, a world of leisure or the conquest of 
disease – others may be repressed in official discourse, such as the narratives of 
Frankenstein or Brave New World (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 1995).  
 
Scientific practice has traditionally been seen as insulated from such cultural forms, 
yet whether implicitly or explicitly it is routinely influenced by them, as for example, 
the often unstated ‘cultural’ drive of science towards ‘precision’ and ‘control’. A 
major object is to explore what form and extent this influence takes. How do 
imaginaries shape trajectories of scientific research, and help define ‘doable’ and 
worthwhile scientific problems? What role do they play in the allocation of funding? 
How do they mobilise public and private interest and opposition? And how can social 
science help open up such imaginaries to wider public scrutiny and debate, for the 
benefit of science as well as society? In the context of a general dialectic between 
openness and closure that characterises any process of innovation, the aim is to open 
up nanotechnological imaginaries and scientific potentialities before they are 
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inadvertently closed-down and ‘black-boxed’ through commitments to specific 
problems, products and applications (Stirling 2005).  
 
Nanotechnologies are framed by scientific and engineering imaginaries that have 
longstanding antecedents (see for example Shapin 1994, Noble 1977; 1997). Their 
promise is infused with dreams of perfect engineering, of complete control over the 
physical structure of matter and, eventually, the creation of autonomous, self-
replicating entities. Such imaginaries render nanotechnologies visualisable and to 
some extent already familiar (e.g. the macro-level machine expressed at the nano-
level). The ability to operate at the nanoscale – atom-by-atom – symbolises an 
expression or ambition of power. It represents the material world subordinated to 
human will with unprecedented degrees of precision and control.  
 
At the same time, this vision of total control is something of a double-edged sword if 
not an Achilles heel. For the empirical invisibility of nanotechnology, beneath the 
threshold of the human senses (rather like genetic modification and nuclear 
technology before it, see: Beck 1992; Erikson 1994), makes it almost impossible to 
verify whether it is in fact under human control - thus providing fertile ground for 
voices of opposition; for instance, dystopias that build upon Drexler’s imaginary of 
self-replicating ‘grey goo’ as a central motif. Indeed, whilst this notion of ‘grey goo’ 
is dismissed by mainstream nanoscientists (Royal Society/ Royal Academy of 
Engineering 2004), it has achieved a certain prominence among the public and media, 
not least due to interventions by the heir to the UK throne. In debates over GM food, 
negative popular imaginaries tended to be dismissed or ignored and it would seem 
prudent that the same mistake is not repeated in the area of nanotechnology.  
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Such research poses significant methodological challenges including the development 
of novel and reflexive relationships with nanoscientists and other relevant actors, both 
at academic research sites, and within corporate R&D settings. To understand the 
nature, origins and effects of such imaginaries, and to find ways of opening them to 
greater scientific reflection and public debate, will require informed interaction with 
scientific actors in their own ‘lifeworlds’. This implies a potential role for social 
scientist ethnographers as a new kind of actor-participant in those scientific 
knowledge-communities. Similar developments are afoot in social science research 
with the post-genomic sciences.  
 
 II. Public engagement 
A social science of nanotechnologies should ask in what ways can processes of public 
dialogue open up and help indirectly to shape ‘upstream’ R&D of emerging 
nanotechnologies, and seek to build-in appropriate models of public engagement into 
the development of nanotechnologies. 
 
Since 2000, when the UK House of Lords Science and Society report buried the 
misconceived deficit model of public understanding of science (Wynne 1991; 1995), 
‘public engagement’ has become the new mantra (at least in UK and EU science 
policy). Much of this new ‘listening mode’ for science has been taken up with the aim 
or expectation of restoring public trust and authority for science. The more radical 
idea that public inputs might legitimately reshape scientific and technological 
enterprises as a condition for their public legitimacy has not been a prominent feature 
of the new discourse of public engagement. The suggestion that public engagement 
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may have several different rationales and objectives, including the stimulation of 
greater self-reflection within science about its own assumptions and expectations, 
effectively about its own cultural forms, has been made more recently (Wynne 2003). 
As described before, there is also an emerging consensus that such engagement  
should be focussed on upstream processes of R&D priority-setting and funding, in 
addition to the downstream impacts of innovation (Department of Trade and Industry 
2004; Grove-White et al. 2000; HM Treasury 2004; Macnaghten 2004; Nature 2004; 
Royal Society/ Royal Academy of Engineering 2004; Wilsdon and Willis 2004; 
Wynne 2001) 
 
However, even though there is increased policy and institutional acceptance of the 
need to move upstream, precisely what this entails remains ambiguous and open to 
multiple interpretations. For some, upstream engagement is still assumed to be about 
earlier anticipation and more effective management of risks, impacts and 
consequences. Such assumptions downplay a critical dimension of public concern, 
which is that there are unpredicted consequences that scientific risk assessment is 
incapable of identifying, whether it takes place upstream, downstream or somewhere 
in between (Marris et al. 2001; Wynne 2001). Instead, publics often want to ask more 
fundamental questions about driving human purposes, ownership, control and 
responsibility. Modern science and technology in general has suffered an unhealthy 
dearth of any such debate, which has instead been focussed on risk.   
 
It has been recognised that nanotechnologies and their convergences with adjacent 
domains like Information Communication Technologies and biotechnologies, make 
prediction of future effects a decreasingly credible aspiration – and this from an 
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unpromising starting-point in terms of existing track-record (Joy 2000). The claim of 
reliable predictive control through risk assessment has to be re-thought as the basic 
reflex response of policy and scientific institutions to public concern or hesitation 
(Sarewitz et al. 2000; Guston & Sarewitz 2002). Upstream public engagement may 
sometimes help to create the conditions for better risk prediction. But this should not 
be the primary reason for this change of focus. Rather it is that upstream processes are 
key sites of undeliberated shaping of future worlds, as explained in the previous 
section. If these are to be elicited, debated and maybe amended, social science need to 
develop frameworks of accountability and learning which so far remain undeveloped.  
 
The methodological challenge is to build on a range of ‘upstream’ deliberative 
methods, involving both experts and public, through innovating novel techniques such 
as focus groups, citizen juries, scenario workshops and deliberative mapping (Grove-
White et al. 1997; 2000; Macnaghten 2004; Stirling 2005; Stirling, Davies and 
Burgess 2004), as well as ethnographic methods. Key research questions that need to 
be addressed are: how can ‘upstream’ questions be addressed in open, accountable 
and resolvable ways; how can conventional forms of risk assessment and ethical 
analysis be integrated with wider social and political questions about purposes, 
alternative scientific trajectories, ownership, control and responsibility; and what 
lessons can be drawn from technological domains where upstream public engagement 
is exclusively staged at the downstream stage – as took place, arguably, in the case of 
GM crops? It is also important to scrutinise what counts as successful public 
engagement. Is it the avoidance of immediate conflict, or longer-term changes 
towards greater resilience in the culture and practices of science? (Nowotny et al 
2001) 
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 III. Governance 
By building social science research into the upstream development of nanotechnology 
it will be possible to innovate new frameworks for the governance and regulation of 
nanotechnologies that seek to be more anticipatory, resilient and socially intelligent. 
 
Confronted with rapidly advancing and converging nanotechnologies, policymakers 
and regulators need to identify frameworks of governance that are adaptive and 
anticipatory, yet which recognize the limits of prediction (Bentley & Wilsdon 2003; 
Sarewitz et al. 2000). When technological controversies erupt, the usual political 
response has been to look for regulatory solutions based on familiar science-based 
techniques of risk assessment. This pattern is already evident in debates around 
nanotechnologies, which are focusing heavily on regulatory responses to the 
uncertainties and potential hazards of nanoparticle toxicity (Royal Society/ Royal 
Academy of Engineering 2004; European Commission 2004).  
 
These responses, using the best science available, are necessary – but crucially, not in 
themselves sufficient. Further insights and policy innovations need to be developed 
and explored in practice. As Michael Power has argued, there is now an 
overwhelming tendency in political and organisational life to reach for the ‘risk 
management of everything’ (Power 2004). However, when faced with potentially 
disruptive innovations, the danger is that risk assessment – however participatory – 
merely digs us deeper into the hole from which we are trying to escape. It avoids a 
much deeper predicament that arises from recognising the realities of ignorance and 
ambiguity. Debates that are too often framed in terms only of risk and safety – 
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typically asking the question, ‘Is it safe?’ - imply that the likelihood of certain 
outcomes, and the question of social commitment, is susceptible to rational 
calculation. More challenging questions that flow from ignorance concern the longer-
term social purposes as well as consequences of a technology’s development, and 
what are the alternatives that might be available?  
 
This concentration on risk is an understandable way of rationalising an otherwise 
open and daunting set of questions. It reflects what Zygmunt Bauman describes as 
modernity’s “gardening instinct” (Bauman 1991). Yet this desire to tidy the borders of 
our democracy means that frameworks of governance and regulation may be stripped 
of meaningful content. Fundamental questions arise from further examination of 
today's ‘global knowledge-economy’, perhaps the dominant self-characterisation of 
contemporary society and its established institutions (de Sousa Santos 2003). What 
kinds of cultural conflict are now emerging centred on the production of scientific 
knowledge? Are there forms of politics (e.g. new social movements and mass forms 
of alienated citizenship) which call for new forms of governance of science and 
technology as the major forces shaping human worlds? What new institutional and 
organisational forms may be appropriate to articulate these inchoate, globally-
distributed concerns, conflicts and democratic aspirations?  
 
From these wider perspectives, conventional discourses of regulation, risk and ethics 
look increasingly inadequate. New government commitments to ‘upstream’ public 
dialogue with science – if taken seriously – may run rapidly into head-to-head conflict 
with concerns about global competitiveness and the economic potential of national 
science-systems competing aggressively for global investment and trained personnel. 
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These issues may be difficult to address in a purely national context, especially when 
public concerns do not correspond with those assumed by scientific, industrial and 
policymaking elites (Grove-White et al. 1997; Marris et al. 2001).  
 
In the case of nanotechnologies, the contours of public concern are not restricted to 
the risks of nanoparticle toxicity. There are other fundamental questions that need to 
be asked: Why these technologies? Why not others? Who needs them, and what 
human purposes are driving them? Under what conditions will they be enacted; and 
who sets those conditions? Who is controlling them? Who benefits from them? What 
contingency-plans might there be to contain unanticipated disasters? Can those in 
charge be trusted? Drawing on the lessons of from genetic modification and other 
controversies, programmes of research need to explore how governance and 
regulation can be extended to incorporate a wider set of cultural and social, and 
indeed technical, factors (Kearnes et al. forthcoming). 
 
 
 IV. Globalisation 
Fourthly, we need to examine the emerging patterns of nanotechnological innovation 
worldwide, and what social and governance challenges these pose both globally, and 
for nation-states? 
 
Research is required to map the shifting geographies of nanotechnological innovation 
and knowledge production. As nanotechnologies start to play a more significant role 
in the global knowledge economy, what new opportunities for wealth creation will 
they create? How will they contribute to shifts in the global distribution of knowledge, 
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resources and power? What forms will these take? Might they allow developing 
nations to ‘leapfrog’ into a new technological paradigm? Or might they reinforce 
inadvertent forms of epistemic exclusion, stratified industrialised knowledge-
economy divisions of international labor, and new forms of public alienation (Castells 
1996)? How will such governance challenges play out across different geopolitical 
and knowledge sectors?  
 
It is important to understand how the global development of nanotechnologies will be 
shaped by the relationship between the different temporalities of technological 
innovation, regulation and societal deliberation (Jessop 2000). Risk discourses are 
intervening increasingly intensely in the very process of product innovation, shaping 
the direction of entire industries in ways which are not easily anticipated. 
Nanotechnologies are emerging in a situation of ‘risk sensitisation’, which creates 
tensions between cycles of innovation and capital accumulation, and the need for 
governments and industries to respond to public anxieties about possible hazards. 
Regulation, product testing and more expansive modes of public engagement and 
dialogue slow down the process of entry to the marketplace, which may sit in tension 
with the need for rapid investment return.  
 
Conventional characterisations suggest that precaution acts as a barrier to innovation. 
In a European context, several recent studies have shown that this is not necessarily 
the case, and precautionary approaches can in fact act as a stimulus for new forms of 
innovation (European Environment Agency 2001). However, it remains an empirical 
question as to how such interactions will play out on a global scale. Regulation may 
slow down the product cycle, or it may provide advantages to some economic actors, 
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possibly favouring larger corporations over smaller start-ups. It may reinforce the 
economic power of the US and other leading nations, or enable new, niche players to 
emerge (as for example, Finland became a surprisingly successful player in mobile 
communications technologies). In any case the escalating stakes of managing the 
public acceptance of scientific innovations in the interests of keeping competitive in 
the global knowledge-economy have brought newly emergent pressures and 
expectations on the social sciences as policy-actors. Our scholarly communities will 
have to respond constructively and responsibly to such pressures; our proposals 
attempt to do this in part by tying to step ahead of those pressures, and to suggest 
other opportunities and agenda, both for research and for the policy it hopes to 
enlighten.  
 
To summarise a political economy social science agenda might embrace the following 
questions: Where is nanotechnological R&D being carried out and by which kinds of 
institutions; what factors shape, accelerate or impede national and international 
innovation trajectories; what is the impact of emerging regulatory and governance 
(including civil society) processes on R&D and product development?  And how are 
these dynamics directly or indirectly influencing the substantive intellectual contents  
and cultures of nanoscientific knowledge?  
 
 Emergence 
Finally we need to develop new frameworks of theoretical reflection to understand the 
emergence of nanotechnologies, and, in particular, to develop approaches that move 
beyond conceptualising the future in terms of prediction or control.  
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In moving from a predictive to post-predictive paradigm, social science needs to 
develop a set of theories and methodologies for relating to the complexities of 
multiple ‘futures’ (Prigogine 1997; Grove-White et al. 1997; Sarewitz 2000; Wilsdon 
& Willis 2004; Urry 2003). The central notion here is that nanotechnologies are a set 
of dynamic and potentially unbounded systems. Science and technology as cultural 
forms, are the ultimate objects of interest, however precisely these might be defined in 
all their variety. They develop collective patterns and non-linear consequences not 
present within their individual components. Such systems demonstrate both the ‘end 
of certainty’ and long-term irreversibilities, as well as heterogeneity and emergence as 
they become locked in to certain path-dependencies (Prigogine 1997; Rip and Kemp 
1998). 
 
In exploring the nature of technological emergence, the goal is to understand the 
complex role that these systems and their different temporalities play (Adam 1998). A 
number of social scientists have analysed the role of expectation, or future-oriented 
imaginaries,  in emerging technologies (see for example: van Lente 1993; van Lente 
& Rip 1998; Brown et al. 2000; Brown 2003; Brown & Michael 2003). Such analyses 
are fundamentally about future promises, and their epistemic and ontological 
dimensions. They suggest that the emergence of new technologies is characterised by 
complex and heterogeneous cycles of hope, expectation, hype and disappointment, 
which are connected with material realities. Understanding the heterogeneous time 
horizons and expectation dynamics embedded within new technological domains is 
crucial to how new technologies may materialise and become ‘stabilised’ as a 
transportable ‘actor-network’.  
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Twenty years ago, the philosopher Hans Jonas warned that ‘Modern technology has 
introduced actions of such novel scale, objects and consequences that the framework 
of former ethics can no longer contain them’ (1984, p. 34).  At the time, he had in 
mind the awesome transformations wrought by nuclear and genetic technologies. But 
his analysis can be applied with equal force to the changes that are underway now at 
the nanoscale. The questions that Jonas posed can be posed afresh today. If these 
technologies enable human interventions at a novel scale – the very atoms and 
molecules that are the building blocks of matter – does this require an equivalent shift 
in the scale of our ethical and sociological imagination? 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to outline a prospective social science agenda on 
nanotechnologies as a particular means to further develop a social science of science, 
technology and society relations. Such a programme of research promises to develop 
wider social learning and insight on questions of emerging technologies more 
generally, and on the ways in which social and ethical considerations can be build into 
the technical and scientific agendas at an early stage. A programme of research of this 
kind promises to build capacity in the social sciences in at least three distinct ways. 
 
First, it will do so locally by drawing upon, extending and connecting theoretical 
insights in social theory, postmodernism, actor network theory, science and 
technology studies, and complexity. Second, it will significantly advance the theory 
and practice of interdisciplinarity as it applies to collaboration between social 
sciences, humanities, natural sciences and engineering disciplines. Third, it will 
develop a social science that engages with and contributes to policy debates in ‘real-
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time’. Both these latter capacity-developments involve more than intellectual 
developments in themselves. They also involve new knowledge-producing 
relationships and professional responsibilities, with respect to both the natural 
sciences and policy practices. Potentially this would involve social sciences 
becoming, modestly, actors in those worlds and not only observers and commentators 
of them. 
 
Such an enhanced capability would enable the social sciences to play a strategic role 
in providing the social research and analysis necessary for the future governance, 
regulation and public appraisal of emerging nanosciences and -technologies. By 
clarifying the differential social values and implications embedded within prospective 
nanotechnology developments such a programme would contribute actively to 
society’s resources for more intelligent and more humanly- as well as technically-
robust debate and practice in such matters. 
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